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Revocation of Drivers' Licenses for Out-of-State Violations
In an effort to cope with the rapidly growing number of automobile
accidents, several states have adopted statutes authorizing the revoca-
tion or suspension of drivers' licenses for traffic offenses committed
out of state. Following the lead of New York, Pennsylvania, and others,
Wyoming has included such a provision in its Chauffeurs' and Drivers'
License Act of 1947.1
The statute, which gives to Wyoming its first plan for licensing driv-
ers, provides for the mandatory suspension, cancellation, or revocation
of licenses of drivers who have been convicted of certain specified of-
fenses.2 In addition, the statute vests discretionary authority with the
State Highway Department to conduct investigations and to suspend,
cancel, or revoke licenses upon various findings of fact, one of which is
that the licensee "has committed an offense in another State which, if
committed in this State, would be grounds for suspension or revoca-
tion." 3 A driver may obtain judicial review of a decision of the High-
way Department suspending, cancelling, or revoking his license by filing
an application for a hearing within 30 days before the district court of
the county in which he resides.
4
It has long been recognized that operation of vehicles on the public
highways is a conditional privilege and not a natural right, and that the
various states, under their police power, have the authority to stipulate
reasonable conditions under which the privilege may be exercised. Courts
have upheld the revocation of licenses of residents of a state for offenses
committed within the state,5 and have also permitted the imposition of
1Wyo. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1947) §§60-1501-60-1528, Laws (1947) c. 162.
2Wyo. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1947) §60-1515 (1) and (2).
3 Wyo. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1947) §60-1515 (3): "The Department may conduct
an investigation to determine, whether the litense shall be suspended, cancelled or
revoked upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee:
(a) .. . (b) Has committed an offense in another State which, if committed in this
State, would be grounds for suspension or revocation. .... .
Section 60-1515 (4) gives the Department broad authority upon appropriate
findings to suspend or cancel or revoke a license for a period of not more than one
year "for cause satisfactory to the Department."
4Ibid. In addition Subsection 4 concludes with the proviso that "the district
court in any such proceeding shall have power, in its discretion, upon motion and
affidavit of the licensee, and with or without hearing thereon as the court shall
decide, to temporarily set aside or suspend the action of the Highway Department
upon such terms or conditions as the court may determine until such time as the
matter may be finally determined .... 1
5 Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 4 S. E. (2d) 762 (1939); Law v. Common-
wealth, 171 Va. 449, 199 S. E. 516 (1938) ; Nulter v. State Road Commission, 119
W. Va. 312, 193 S. E. 549, dissent at 194 S. E. 270 (1937) ; Commonwealth v. Harris,
278 Ky. 218, 128 S. W. (2d) 579 (1939); Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S. W.
(2d) 930 (1940); Rawson v. Department of Licenses, 15 Wash. (2d) 364, 130 P.
(2d) 876 (1942).
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certain regulations upon non-resident motorists.6 The Wyoming statute
presents the additional question of whether a state has the power to use
out-of-state traffic offenses as a basis for the revocation of drivers'
licenses.
An argument that might be advanced against the validity of the Wyo-
ming statute is that regardless of a state's right to make a domestic
occurrence cause for revocation of a license, it is an unreasonable exten-
sion of police power to use as a cause an extrastate happening, because in
so doing the state extends its police power beyond its borders.7 Such a
contention would seem to overlook the fact, however, that a state is not
limited to its own boundaries in guarding the safety of its citizens; it
may and frequently does take cognizance of what happens in other states.8
In basing the revocation of a license on an offense committed in another
state, Wyoming does not extend its police power into the other state (nor
does the other state extend its police power into Wyoming), but merely
determines from the licensee's conduct in the other state that he is
unqualified to operate an automobile in Wyoming. Revocation or sus-
pension of drivers' licenses for offenses committed out-of-state would
seem but a reasonable exercise of the state's power to exclude incom-
petent drivers from its highways.9 Moreover, provisions in the Wyoming
statute for judicial review of decisions of the state Highway Department
6 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 622-624 (1915) (state motor vehicle law
imposing reasonable license fees on motors including those of non-residents held
a valid exercise of police power and not a burden on interstate commerce) ; Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927) (upheld substituted personal service on non-resident
motorist in a suit arising out of an auto accident occurring within the state) ; Kane
v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 167 (1916) (sustained statute requiring non-resident
owners of motor vehicles to appoint a state official as agent upon whom process
could be served in legal proceedings against them resulting from the operation of
their motor vehicles within the state) ; Hirsch v. Warren, 253 Ky. 62, 68 S. W. (2d)
767 (1934) (held statute valid which provided for substituted service on secretary
of state in sult against non-resident).
These regulations have been sustained in part on the fictions of consent or
waiver; i.e., that the non-resident using the highways of a state consents thereby
to any reasonable measure imposed by that state.
7 For a comparable argument see the dissent in Niulter v. State Road Comnis-
sioner, 119 W. Va. 312, 321, 193 S. E. 549, dissent at 194 S. E. 270 (1937).
8.L person may be deprived of a privilege because of a conviction in another
state. For example, several cases have sustained the disbarment of attorneys who
had been convicted in another state of felonies or misdemeanors involving moral
turpitude. In re Shepard, 35 Cal. App. 492, 170 Pac. 442 (1917); In re Peters, 73
Mont. 284, 235 Pac. 772 (1925); State ez rel. Sanford v. Riddle, 213 Ala. 430, 105
So. 259 (1925) ; In re Ker7, 32 Idaho 737, 188 Pac. 40 (1920) ; EX parte McDonald,
112 Mont. 129, 113 P. (2d) 790 (1941).
9 The revocation or suspension of the privilege of operating a motor vehicle is
not the taking of property without due process of law. Cases cited supra note 5.
Nvulter v. State Road Commissioner, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S. E. 549, dissent at 194
S. E. 270 (1937) involved the application of a "Financial Responsibility" Statute
to an accident out-of-state. W. Va. Acts (1935) c. 61, §3 provided that a person's
license should be suspended for failure to pay within 30 days a final judgment of
$50 or more secured against him in a court in any state or Canada for damages
on account of personal or property injury resulting from operation of a motor
vehicle. The court rejected the contention that it was an unconstitutional exten-
sion of police power to revoke a license for failure to pay a judgment of a court
of another state.
Although there are no cases directly in point, it seems very unlikely that suspen-
sion of a license for an out-of-state traffic offense would be deemed unconstitutional




would seem to provide drivers with adequate protection from possible
administrative abuse.'
0
Few judicial opinions could be located dealing with statutory provi-
sions similar to those in the Wyoming statute. In Kerns Appeal" the
Secretary of Revenue of Pennsylvania suspended the license of a resident
of that state who had been convicted in New Jersey for violating the
speed limit of New Jersey. In affirming the suspension, the Pennsylvania
court discussed the essential reasonableness of the statute in the following
language: "The real purpose of the act under which petitioner's license
was suspended was to control the licenses of those operators who do not
obey the motor vehicle regulations on the public highways, whether they
demonstrate their disregard, recklessness or unfitness in Pennsylvania or
elsewhere."
The section of the Wyoming act authorizing the suspension, cancella-
tion, or revocation of licenses for out-of-state offenses is apt to present
difficult problems of administration which may defeat its purpose. One
such problem may arise from the requirement that the offense must be
one "which, if committed in this State, would be grounds for suspension
or revocation.' 1 2 Because of the lack of uniformity in the traffic codes
of the various states, the Highway Department and reviewing courts may
have difficulty in determining whether a violation for which a driver
has been convicted in another state is one which would be recognized as
an offense in Wyoming. In Cashion v. Harnett,13 a New York resident
had been convicted in Massachusetts for driving while under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor, and his right to drive in Massachusetts had
been suspended. The commissioner of motor vehicles of New York there-
upon revoked his New York chauffeur's license pursuant to a New York
statute 14 which provided that a driver's license must be revoked for driv-
ing "while intoxicated," even though the conviction may be in another
state. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, however,
sustained an order of certiorari annulling the revocation of the license on
the grounds that proof of intoxication was essential for conviction under
the New York statute, but not under the Massachusetts law, which merely
forbade "driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor"; hence
1o Note 4 supra.
1151 District and County Reports 136 (Pa. 1944). The motorist contended at
the hearing that while he had on four occasions exceeded the New Jersey speed
limit of 40 miles per hour, he had never exceeded 50 miles per hour, the Pennsyl-
vania limit. He, therefore, c6ntended that the Pennsylvania authorities could not
suspend or revoke his license; for he had done nothing which would violate the
Pennsylvania law had the action occurred in Pennsylvania. But the court held that
this was a difference of degree only and did not change the essence, substance, or
identity of the offense; for the offense was that of "speeding" and it made no
difference in what state it occurred. The law of the state wherein the offense was
committed was held to govern, a conviction therein was res judicata in Pennsylvania,
and the Pennsylvania Secretary of Revenue could, therefore, suspend the license.
The suspension was pursuant to Pa. Stats. 75, §192(e), Laws (1929) 905, §615(e),
which provided that the Secretary of Revenue may suspend after a hearing "the
operator's license . . . of any person licensed in the Commonwealth upon receiving
notice of the conviction of such person in another state of an offense therein which
if committed in this Commonwealth, would be grounds for the suspension or revoca-
tion of the license of an operator."
12 Note 3 supra.
13 255 N. Y. S. 169 (1932).
14 Section 71 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of New York, as amended by Laws
(1930), c. 26. The conviction in Massachusetts was under Mass. G. L. c. 90, §24.
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